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THE IMMEDIATE AND LASTING IMPACTS OF THE
2008 ECONOMIC COLLAPSE-LEHMAN BROTHERS,
GENERAL MOTORS, AND THE SECURED CREDIT
MARKETS
Edward J. Estrada *
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the economic meltdown that began in the spring of
2008, immediate and longer term ramifications began to ripple
through all aspects of the economy. Clearly, these tremors have
not yet subsided, and continued fallout will be felt in the coming
years. Importantly, even those companies and industries that
have seemingly passed through the most immediate wave of im-
pacts will be susceptible to the ongoing struggle to achieve sus-
tainable growth. Many such companies may experience future de-
faults, largely dependent upon the strength and vitality of
economic growth in the coming year and their industry perfor-
mance in that timeframe.
In 2008, as the financial giants of the world began to struggle
and collapse, some in the course of a few days, it was widely be-
lieved that the credit markets, and in turn the global economy,
would completely seize up, causing an economic catastrophe un-
paralleled in modern history.' While tumultuous, what did in fact
happen was something far less dramatic, but it had a lasting
negative impact, nevertheless.
As often happens in crises, some impacts were to be expected
and other events were complete surprises. For example, the re-
sulting flight from risk by investors (both corporate and individu-
* Partner in the Commercial Restructuring and Bankruptcy Group of the New York
office of Reed Smith LLP. The author would like to thank Aaron Bourke, an associate in
the Commercial Restructuring and Bankruptcy Group of the New York office of Reed
Smith LLP, for his contributions to the article.
1. See, e.g., Erin McClain, Economic Meltdown/Five Chaotic Weeks That Shook the
Financial World, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Sept. 6, 2009, at Al.
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al) that occurred was quite expected once observers began to ap-
preciate the breadth of the economic collapse.2 Many observers
expected the withdrawal of traditional lenders from the long- and
short-term lending markets. Of course, any discussion of the lend-
ing environment during the financial crisis would be woefully in-
adequate without including the largest and most active lender
during this period: the federal government ("U.S. Government" or
"Government").
This article analyzes the early days of the credit crisis as well
as two of the largest casualties of that period-Lehman Brothers
and General Motors. In addition, by focusing on the bankruptcy
proceedings of these two entities as well as other judicial deci-
sions rendered since the financial crisis began, it examines the
role that courts have played in the crisis.
II. DIscussIoN
Gauging the extent of any crisis can be accomplished in many
ways. One telling method is to examine those entities most signif-
icantly affected by the events. Here, we examine the collapse of
two vital American companies-Lehman Brothers and General
Motors. In many ways, the crisis can legitimately be said to have
exposed and exacerbated underlying weaknesses in these compa-
nies; even so, the shocking speed and individual circumstances of
each collapse warrant discussion. Importantly, the disparate
reaction of the U.S. Government to each collapse also warrants
analysis. Accordingly, the bases for the different responses are
addressed below. The crisis also signaled a shift in the secured
lending environment, including a wave of court decisions demon-
strating suspicion and adversity towards secured lenders. Wheth-
er such rulings were a temporary reaction or will continue re-
mains to be seen, but the impact of the crisis on the secured
lending market-the lifeblood of most major corporations-was
immediate and in certain cases may be long-lasting. Analysis of
each of these topics provides insight into the unprecedented im-
pacts of the financial crisis.
2. See, e.g., Paul J. Lim, Diversify! Diversify! (Yes, Even Now), N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2008, at BU7.
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A. Lehman Brothers
One of the starkest lessons provided by the financial crisis of
2008 and early 2009 is seen in the vulnerability of particular fi-
nancial firms within the American (and perhaps global) financial
system to economic shocks, and the resulting systemic risk aris-
ing from the interrelatedness of these firms. The collapse of
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. ("Lehman Brothers") arguably
provided the most glaring example of this latent fragility. Leh-
man Brothers' demise was more than merely the death of a titan
of America's financial system; it laid bare just how susceptible
America's major financial institutions had become to massive
losses due to the use of leverage and exposure to concentrated in-
vestments. The sheer scope of Lehman Brothers' collapse threat-
ened the very vitality of financial markets worldwide.' As a re-
sult, Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy proceeding raised unique
issues that bear examination in assessing the lasting impacts of
the financial crisis.
This section will begin with a discussion of Lehman Brothers'
bankruptcy case, including: (i) a brief overview of Lehman Broth-
ers' pre-filing business, (ii) an analysis of events leading up to
Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing, (iii) a factual summary of
Lehman Brothers' Chapter 11 proceeding, and (iv) a brief discus-
sion of the accounting methods utilized by Lehman Brothers, as
set forth in the court-appointed examiner's report. It will then
provide an analysis of the unique issues raised in Lehman Broth-
ers' bankruptcy proceeding influenced by-and in turn affecting-
the financial crisis, including: (i) the speed with which the bank-
ruptcy court approved the sale of Lehman Brothers' assets, and
(ii) whether the U.S. Government should have intervened to save
Lehman Brothers' business.
1. Lehman Brothers Background
Prior to filing for Chapter 11 protection on September 15, 2008,
Lehman Brothers was one of the largest financial institutions in
the world.4 Its business focused on "equity and fixed income sales,
3. Louise Story & Ben White, The Road to Lehman's Failure Was Littered with Lost
Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at Bl.
4. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape of Wall St.,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 2008, at Al.
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trading and research, investment banking, asset management,
private investment management, and private equity to corpora-
tions, governments and municipalities, institutional clients and
high-net-worth individuals."> Its business included:
(i) advising on and structuring transactions; (ii) serving as a market-
maker and/or intermediary in the global marketplace, including
making securities and other financial instrument products available
as both an issuer and an intermediary . . ; (iii) originating loans for
distribution to clients in the securitization or loan trading market;
(iv) providing investment management and advisory services; and (v)
acting as an underwriter to clients.6
Lehman Brothers consisted of three major business divisions: the
Capital Markets division, the Investment Banking division, and
the Investment Management division.' In short, Lehman Broth-
ers was involved in virtually every segment of the global econo-
my.
The Capital Markets division constituted 64% of Lehman
Brothers' business., Its activities included "secondary trading, fi-
nancing, mortgage origination and securitization, prime broker-
age and research activities in fixed income and equity products."9
As of August 31, 2008, the Capital Markets division had reported
assets of $586 billion, and it reported nine-month revenues of
$16.2 billion. 0 The Investment Banking division constituted 20%
of Lehman Brothers' business.,, Its activities included advising
corporate, institutional, and government clients on mergers and
acquisitions, and raising capital for clients by underwriting public
and private offerings of debt and equity instruments.12 "In the
nine months ended August 31, 2008, [the Investment Banking di-
vision] recorded revenues of approximately $2.3 billion. . . ."13 The
Investment Management division constituted 16% of Lehman
5. Debtors' Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code
at 28, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010)
[hereinafter Lehman Disclosure Statement].
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 29.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 28.
12. Id. at 29.
13. Id.
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Brothers' business.14 Its activities included providing "strategic
investment advice and services to institutional and high-net-
worth clients . . . ."'6 The division consisted of an asset manage-
ment business and a private investment management business. 6
As of May 31, 2008, the Investment Management division re-
ported $277 billion in assets under management.17
2. Events Leading to Lehman Brothers' Bankruptcy Filing
Lehman Brothers has been described by many as both a major
cause and a major victim of the 2008 financial crisis. In the years
leading up to the financial crisis, Lehman Brothers pursued an
increasingly risky business strategy (in hindsight at least) that
relied on massive amounts of leverage, leaving Lehman Brothers
extremely vulnerable to even the smallest market downturn and
consequent loss of confidence among counterparties. As described
in more detail below, the sudden stress on the financial system
caused by defaults in the subprime mortgage and commercial real
estate markets caused a loss of investor confidence and triggered
a precipitous drop in the short-term financing available to Leh-
man Brothers to finance its daily operations. Due to Lehman
Brothers' massive size and the extent of its involvement in the
global financial market, its sudden decline roiled financial mar-
kets and threatened the entire U.S. economy with collapse.
Lehman Brothers' high-risk, high-leverage business strategy is
identified as the primary cause of its collapse.'" This strategy
dates back to 2006, when Lehman Brothers (and many other
large institutional market participants) made a determination to
substantially increase leverage on its capital, borrowing an in-
creasingly large amount of money to operate its business.', Dur-
ing this time, Lehman Brothers transformed from a "moving"
company-focusing primarily on brokerage services-to a "sto-
rage" company-using its own balance sheet to acquire assets for
14. Id. at 28.
15. Id. at 29.
16. Id. at 29-30.
17. Id. at 30.
18. Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 64-65, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings
Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Examiner's Report].
19. Id. at 4.
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long-term investment.20 These longer-term investments focused
primarily on commercial real estate, leverage loans, and private
equity.21 As a result of these investments, an increasing propor-
tion of Lehman Brothers' assets consisted of illiquid, risky as-
sets.22
Lehman Brothers was only able to sustain its high-risk, high-
leverage strategy by borrowing up to hundreds of billions of dol-
lars every day in the short-term financing markets.23 This meant
that Lehman Brothers' capacity to finance its daily operations re-
lied heavily upon its access to lenders, which was dependent, in
large part, on the continuing confidence of its counterparties. 24
The slightest loss of confidence could deprive Lehman Brothers of
its only source of financing and leave it with vastly inadequate
capital reserves.25 Shortly before filing for bankruptcy, Lehman
Brothers had $700 billion of assets and corresponding liabilities,
and only $25 billion of capital. 26 In its July 2008 Form 10-Q re-
port, Lehman Brothers reported that it had a net leverage ratio of
12.1:1.27 However, according to a report released by the Joint
Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress in June 2008, Lehman
Brothers actually had a leverage ratio of 30.7:1 as of March 31,
2008.5
The collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 jolted the financial
markets and is identified as an initial trigger in the loss of confi-
dence that led to Lehman Brothers' collapse.29 Lehman Brothers'
counterparties, their confidence shaken by Bear Stearns' demise,
stopped providing Lehman Brothers with much of the short-term
financing that it needed to survive. In the first half of 2008, the
value of Lehman Brothers' stock fell by 73% as it lost its sources
20. Id. at 59.
21. Id. at 60.
22. Id. at 62-63.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 55 (July 10, 2008).
28. JIM SAXTON, JOINT ECON. COMM., 110-23, THE U.S. HOUSING BUBBLE AND THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: VULNERABILITIES OF THE ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1
(2008). Comparatively, during this period, certain other global banks had significant leve-
rage positions as well. Namely, Freddie Mac had a leverage ratio of 49.1:1, Morgan Stan-
ley had a leverage ratio of 31.8:1, Merrill Lynch had a leverage ratio of 27.5:1, and Gold-
man Sachs had a leverage ratio of 26.9:1. Id.
29. Id. at 5; see also Lehman Disclosure Statement, supra note 5, at 42-43.
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of financing.3 0 Lehman Brothers was forced to cut large portions
of its workforce in multiple layoffs during 2008.31 In what can now
be seen as a last-ditch effort to save its business, Lehman Broth-
ers attempted to finalize a sale of troubled assets to the Korea
Development Bank.32 The sale fell through, however, when the
Korea Development Bank announced that it was unable to satisfy
regulators and raise enough capital.33 Meanwhile, Lehman Broth-
ers announced on September 10, 2008 that it expected to report a
$3.9 billion loss for the third quarter of 2008.34 That same day, its
share price fell 7% after it announced that it was seeking to sell a
majority stake in its investment management business, a shock-
ing announcement.3 5 Lehman Brothers also announced a separate
initiative to spin off its subprime commercial real estate assets to
a new company owned by Lehman Brothers' shareholders. 36
As it became increasingly apparent that a collapse of Lehman
Brothers was imminent,
emergency meetings were held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York over the weekend of September 12, 2008, among Lehman, offi-
cials from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, senior representa-
tives of major New York based financial institutions, Secretary of the
Treasury Henry Paulson, and SEC Chairman Christopher Cox3" to
develop a plan to deal with the Lehman Brothers crisis. 38
During these meetings, as discussed in more detail below, Trea-
sury officials made it clear to Lehman Brothers that, although the
U.S. Government would support it to the extent possible, it would
not provide emergency federal funding to stabilize it and allow it
to continue operations.3 9 In a last-ditch effort to save its business,
Lehman Brothers negotiated a deal with Barclays, but the deal
30. Jenny Anderson & Eric Dash, For Lehman, More Cuts and Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2008, at Cl.
31. Id.
32. See Greg Morcroft, Financials Slip as Korea Snags Weigh on Lehman and Merrill,
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 4, 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/financials-slip-as-kor
ea-snags-weigh-on-lehman-and-merrill.
33. Id.
34. Jenny Anderson & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Said to Be Looking for a Buyer
as Pressure Builds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2008, at Al.
35. Ben White, Pressure Builds as Lehman Faces Mounting Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
11, 2008, at Al.
36. Lehman Disclosure Statement, supra note 5, at 44.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 44-45; Examiner's Report, supra note 18, at 44-45.
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fell through on September 14, 2008 when the parties learned that
U.K. regulators would not waive certain requirements to allow
the sale to close.4o Recognizing that there were no remaining op-
tions for Lehman Brothers, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox rec-
ommended to the Lehman Brothers' board that they file for bank-
ruptcy protection before the markets opened in Asia on
September 15, 2008.41 Lehman Brothers' stock had dropped from
$62.19 per share on January 2, 2008, to $3.65 per share on Sep-
tember 12, 2008, a 94% drop.41
3. Lehman Brothers' Chapter 11 Case
Lehman Brothers filed for chapter 11 protection on September
15, 2008 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York, and Judge James M. Peck was assigned to
its case.43 The proceedings of the various Lehman Brothers' enti-
ties were consolidated for procedural purposes.44 At the time of fil-
ing, Lehman Brothers listed assets worth $639 billion and liabili-
ties worth $613 billion."5 Shortly after filing, Lehman Brothers
began new negotiations with Barclays for the sale of various com-
ponents of its business.46 Barclays refused to agree to the sale
prior to the bankruptcy filing without the protection of a bank-
ruptcy court order because, among other reasons, "it did not want
to expose itself to the risk of potential fraudulent transfer and
other claims."47 However, time was of the essence because, in the
turbulent financial market, the value of Lehman Brothers' assets
was susceptible to sharp fluctuations.48 Accordingly, Barclays set
40. Examiner's Report, supra note 18, at 52-54.
41. Id. at 59-60, 62.
42. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Historical Prices for Jan. 2, 2008, YAHOO!
FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com (enter "LEHMQ.PK' get quotes; then follow "Historical
Prices" hyperlink; then enter "Jan. 2, 2008") (last visited Apr. 15, 2011); Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. Historical Prices for Sept. 12, 2008, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.
com (enter "LEHMQ.PK' get quotes; then follow "Historical Prices" hyperlink; then enter
"Sept. 12, 2008") (last visited Apr. 15, 2011); see also Examiner's Report, supra note 18, at
39-40.
43. Voluntary Petition at 1, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2010).
44. Lehman Disclosure Statement, supra note 5, at 45.
45. Id. at 115.
46. Id. at 46.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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a five-day deadline for consummation of the sale by court order.49
On "September 16, 2008, a motion was filed requesting the bank-
ruptcy court approve the sale procedures and set a sale approval
hearing for ... September 19, 2008."so The bankruptcy court ap-
proved the sale procedures on September 17, 2008.61 On Septem-
ber 19, 2008, the bankruptcy court entered an order approving
the sale to Barclays of Lehman Brothers' North American capital
markets and investment banking business, Lehman Brothers In-
ternational ("LBI"), together with the real property relating to the
corporate headquarters and two data centers.5 2 The sale provided
$1.3 billion for the administration of Lehman Brothers' Chapter
11 proceeding. 3
Subsequent to this initial sale, Lehman Brothers commenced a
process of evaluating its businesses, owned properties, contracts
and loans to determine which were appropriate to sell or monet-
ize.54 Notable asset dispositions to date include the sale of Leh-
man Brothers' Investment Management division, which spun off
the Neuberger Berman Group LLC to hold the Investment Man-
agement business;55 the sale of European and Asian assets to
Nomura International Plc;5 6 and various de minimis sales of less
valuable assets.57
4. Criticism of Lehman Brothers' 363 Sale
After Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection, it was
clear that speed was critical in selling components of Lehman
Brothers' rapidly deteriorating business. Accordingly, as de-
scribed above, both Lehman Brothers and Barclays sought court
approval of an expedited sale of LBI. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555, 2008 WL 4385983 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2008); see also Debtors' Motion to (A) Schedule a Sale Hearing; (B) Es-
tablish Sales Procedures; (C) Approve a Break-Up Fee; and (D) Approve the Sale of the
Purchased Assets and the Assumption and Assignment of Contracts Relating to the Pur-
chased Assets at 2-6, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 17, 2008).
53. Lehman Disclosure Statement, supra note 5, at 46.
54. Id. at 52.
55. Id. at 53.
56. Id. at 53-54.
57. Id. at 54.
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Procedure 2002(a)(2) requires notice twenty-one days prior to a
sale of assets pursuant to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code in order
to give time for competing bids to be entered.58 Lehman Brothers
argued, however, that because LBI was a "wasting asset," the
court should shorten the notice period. 9 Lehman Brothers' Chief
Operating Officer Herbert McDade testified that "if a sale were
not approved by September 19, [2008], Lehman would likely dis-
appear as a going concern."o60 At the September 19, 2008 sale
hearing, McDade additionally testified "that a failure to consum-
mate this sale might ignite a panic in the financial condition of
the country."61 Accordingly, the court shortened the notice period
to only two days and entered an order approving the sale on Sep-
tember 20, 2008.62 In its order, the court determined, among other
things, that good cause existed "to shorten the applicable notice
periods that due, proper, timely, adequate and sufficient notice of
the motion and hearing had been provided, and that a reasonable
opportunity to object and be heard had been given to all interest-
ed persons and entities."3 The court found that any delay in the
sale would result in "immediate and irreparable harm" to Leh-
man Brothers.6 1
The bankruptcy court's decision to approve the sale to Barclay's
became the subject of much scrutiny. For example, various in-
vestment funds that maintained prime brokerage accounts with
LBI and Lehman Brothers Inc. (Europe) ("LBIE"), Lehman's ma-
jor European investment banking and capital markets subsidiary,
appealed the order approving the sale, alleging that the expedited
hearing process had not allowed for proper debate. 65 They alleged,
for various reasons, that Barclays had not purchased LBI in good
faith.66 They argued that the expedited hearing process
(1) deprived [them] of their due process right to learn whether Bar-
clays was a good faith purchaser of LBI and (2) did not provide an
adequate basis for the bankruptcy court itself to conclude that the
58. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2) (2006); see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006).
59. Bay Harbour Mgmt., L.C. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. (In re Lehman Bros.
Holdings Inc.), 415 B.R. 77, 80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 80-81.
62. Id. at 82.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 79.
66. Id. at 79-84.
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sale to Barclays should be approved free and clear of liabilities due
to Barclays's status as a good faith purchaser. 6 7
The District Court for the Southern District of New York ulti-
mately affirmed the sale order and dismissed the appeal,68 but the
appeal is indicative of the types of criticisms leveled at the sale
process.
After the appeal was dismissed, Lehman Brothers, the Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors, and the trustee of LBI under
the Securities Investor Protection Act (collectively, the "Mo-
vants") challenged Judge Peck's sale order under Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.69 On February 22, 2011, Judge
Peck reaffirmed the sale order in a lengthy opinion.o A focal point
of the Movants' papers was the assertion that, as a result of the
chaotic asset sale, Barclays received "a substantial windfall gain
as a result of buying financial assets at a deep discount from fair
value to the detriment of all creditors of the Lehman estates."71
Among the arguments put forth by the Movants was that, due to
the unprecedented speed of the September 19, 2008 hearing that
resulted in the sale order, significant information was left out of
the record.72 Judge Peck held, however, that
[d]espite what in retrospect appears to be a glaring problem of
flawed disclosure, Movants have not carried their burden in estab-
lishing a right to relief from the Sale Order under Rule 60(b) becau-
sethis new information would not have changed the outcome of the
Sale Hearing or altered the form and content of the Sale Order in
any material respect.73
67. Id. at 79.
68. Id. at 86.
69. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Nos. 08-13555, 08-01420, 2011 WL 597970,
at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2011). Under Rule 60(b),
the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged;
it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or ap-
plying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that jus-
tifies relief.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
70. In re Lehman Bros., 2011 WL 597970, at *2, *57.
71. Id. at *4.
72. Id. at *2, *6-9.
73. Id. at *2. Judge Peck also noted that "the failure to disclose material information
... [did] not involve fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct." Id.
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Movants' arguments also revolved around a "clarification letter"
that was not subjected to judicial scrutiny prior to entry of the
sale order, but that was agreed to shortly thereafter, and that
materially changed the terms of the sale of Lehman Brothers' as-
sets, most notably by including in the sale additional assets that
were discovered on the morning of the sale hearing.74 While ad-
mitting the serious deficiencies of the sale hearing, Judge Peck
ultimately upheld the ruling, concluding that "the reality is that
the transaction with Barclays would have been approved in any
event because, taken as a whole, it was demonstrably better for
all parties than any alternative, and no evidence has been pre-
sented to the contrary."75
Despite Judge Peck's reaffirmation of the Lehman Brothers as-
set sale, commentators have voiced substantial concerns about
the impact of the sale in subsequent policy discussions regarding
the long-term dangers of establishing a precedent for expedited
sales pursuant to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. 76 In approving
the proposed sale to Barclays, Judge James M. Peck stated
I know that I need to approve this transaction ... But I also know
that this is so exceptional relative to the experience that I have had
both as a bankruptcy lawyer and judge to know that it could never
be deemed as precedent for future cases unless someone could argue
that there is a similar emergency. It's hard for me to imagine a simi-
lar emergency.77
However, the Lehman Brothers case was followed shortly the-
reafter by the bankruptcy proceedings of Chrysler LLC and Gen-
eral Motors Corp., both cases in which the court approved expe-
dited sales pursuant to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.78 Lawyers
and commentators fretted that the decisions in these cases, made
under the highly strenuous circumstances surrounding the finan-
cial crisis, could set a precedent for future sales pursuant to § 363
of the Bankruptcy Code that would functionally allow for a reor-
ganization plan to be accomplished without providing the many
74. Id. at *3.
75. Id.at*11.
76. John Blakeley, Lehman, Chrysler, GM The Fallout, THE DEAL MAGAZINE, Aug. 7,
2009, available at http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID029091/features/lehman,-chrysler,
-gm-the-fallout.php.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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protections to creditors and claimants that are required by the
Bankruptcy Code.79
Whether the expedited sale in the Lehman Brothers case will
have a long-term lasting impact on bankruptcy court procedure
remains to be seen. However, it serves as a striking example of
the impacts of the financial crisis on established jurisprudence,
and the potential long-lasting effect that the decisions rendered
under the extraordinary stress of the financial crisis may have on
law and business practice in the future.
5. The Government's Decision Not To Intervene to Save Lehman
Brothers
As America's private sector languished in the wake of the fi-
nancial crisis, the country was faced with an uncomfortable ques-
tion: To what extent is it appropriate for the U.S. Government to
intervene in the economy to save vital institutions and prevent a
potentially catastrophic, economy-wide collapse? In the case of
Lehman Brothers, the Government was faced with the particular-
ly difficult question of whether to extend billions of dollars of tax-
payer money to save a failing financial institution that could pro-
vide no collateral and had very uncertain chances of turning its
business around. In a much-debated decision, the Government
determined that it could not intervene to save Lehman Brothers.80
When it became clear that Government assistance would not be
forthcoming, Lehman Brothers had no choice but to file for bank-
ruptcy protection.8 1
Notably, in the months prior to Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy
filing, the New York Federal Reserve provided support to the firm
by engaging in transactions with them that closely resembled fi-
nancing transactions previously used by Lehman Brothers-
called "Repo 105" transactions." These transactions were criti-
cized in a report released on March 11, 2010 by Anton R. Valu-
kas, who was appointed by the bankruptcy court as examiner in
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case.83 The purpose of these
79. Id.
80. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman's Last Hours, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2010, at B1.
81. Jenny Anderson & Charles Duhigg, Death and Near-Death Experiences on Wall
St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at BUL.
82. Examiner's Report, supra note 18, at 732.
83. Id. at 732-39. "Repo 105" transactions were similar to typical repurchase agree-
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transactions was to temporarily reduce the size of Lehman
Brothers' balance sheet by transferring assets that could not be
easily valued and traded in the marketplace.8 As Lehman Broth-
ers reached the brink of bankruptcy, however, it turned to the
Government for increased assistance and was denied.
Six months after the Federal Reserve lent $29 billion to facili-
tate the sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan Chase, Lehman Broth-
ers requested financial assistance from the Government to save
its failing business. 5 Unlike Bear Stearns, however, Lehman
Brothers was denied support.86 The federal Government-
including Federal Reserve Chairman Benjamin S. Bernanke,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York President Timothy F. Geith-
ner, and Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson-informed
Lehman Brothers that the Government did not have the legal au-
thority to rescue Lehman Brothers.17 The Government argued
that it could not legally extend assistance to Lehman Brothers
because Lehman Brothers did not have sufficient collateral to pay
back any loan.88 Thomas C. Baxter Jr., general counsel of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the time, argued that the
Government did not have the authority to provide a 'naked'
ments utilized by financial institutions to obtain short-term financing for operations, whe-
reby one party transfers an asset or security to another party as collateral for a short-term
cash loan, while agreeing to repay the cash and take back the collateral at a specified
point in time. Id. at 750. However, as detailed in Valukas' Report, Lehman Brothers was
able to account for "Repo 105" transactions as sales, rather than financing transactions,
because the collateral transferred was slightly more valuable than the cash transferred in
exchange. Id. at 732. This practice allowed Lehman Brothers to borrow tens of billions of
dollars without reporting increased leverage on its balance sheet. Id. at 757. While Leh-
man Brothers engaged in Repo 105 transactions well before the financial crisis began, its
use of such transactions escalated in late 2007 and 2008. Id. at 740-42.
84. Id. at 737-38.
85. Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Panel Lends Sympathetic Ear to Lehman's Ex-
Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010, at Bl.
86. Id.
87. Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Interven-
tion and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis
Inquiry Comm'n 9 (Sept. 1, 2010) (statement of Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Executive Vice
President and Gen. Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.) [hereinafter Baxter State-
ment].
88. Id. at 10. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act-
signed into law on July 21, 2010-instituted a mechanism for regulators to take control of
and liquidate troubled financial firms if their failure would pose a significant risk to the
financial stability of the United States. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consum-
er Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 204(a), 124 Stat. 1454 (2010) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5384). Henry M. Paulson Jr. has argued that had this mechanism been in place at
the time, the government would have been empowered to save Lehman Brothers. Andrew
Ross Sorkin, Paulson Likes What He Sees in Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at Bl.
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guarantee-one that would be unsecured and not limited in
amount, and would put the U.S. taxpayers at risk for the entirety
of Lehman's trading obligations."89 Mr. Baxter noted that Lehman
Brothers' case differed from Bear Stearns' in that Bear Stearns
had a buyer, JPMorgan Chase, to ensure that its obligations
could be met. 0 Lehman Brothers also differed from American In-
ternational Group ("AIG")-to which the Government provided an
$85 billion loan-because AIG had "sufficient collateral," in the
form of its retail businesses, for the Government's loan. 91
The sheer scope of Lehman Brothers' collapse impacted all cor-
ners of the global financial markets and threatened the very vi-
tality of the financial system. The challenges posed in addressing
Lehman Brothers' problems were unprecedented, and the deci-
sions made in responding to this crisis will likely have lasting
ramifications for both the financial services business and corpo-
rate law. One lesson learned as a result of the financial crisis is
the limits of the Government's willingness to intervene on behalf
of a private company. In the case of Lehman Brothers, the Gov-
ernment determined that it was unwilling to extend assistance on
behalf of a financial behemoth that was unable to provide ade-
quate collateral. This decision had significant meaning not only
for the American public at the time, but also for setting the con-
tours of the relationship between the Government and the private
sector for years to come.
B. General Motors
General Motors Corporation ("General Motors") was arguably
the highest-profile victim of the 2008 financial crisis, as it
represented a traditional and long-established American manu-
facturing brand. An American institution for 100 years, General
Motors was forced into bankruptcy by persistent business prob-
lems exacerbated by the stress of the 2008 financial crisis and
subsequent liquidity crisis.92 General Motors' demise threatened
to topple huge segments of the domestic economy, and, like Leh-
89. Baxter Statement, supra note 87, at 9 (emphasis in original).
90. Id. at 8-9.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Disclosure Statement for Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan at 8-11, In re
Motors Liquidation Co., No. 09-50026 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2010) [hereinafter GM Dis-
closure Statement].
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man Brothers' collapse, it forced the U.S. Government and its ci-
tizenry to weigh how much government involvement in a corpo-
rate reorganization was acceptable to avert catastrophe.
This section will begin with a factual summary of General Mo-
tors' bankruptcy, including: (i) a background of General Motors'
business, (ii) an analysis of the root causes of General Motors'
bankruptcy, (iii) an analysis of the impact of the 2008 financial
crisis on General Motors, and (iv) a brief summary of General
Motors' bankruptcy case. It will then briefly address what has be-
come perhaps the most controversial aspect of General Motors'
reorganization-the unprecedented levels of U.S. Government in-
volvement in a corporate reorganization under the United States
Bankruptcy Code.
1. General Motors Background
Prior to filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on June 1,
2009, General Motors was a market leader in the automotive in-
dustry, a historical mainstay of the United States economy, and
one of the most recognizable companies in the world.93 William C.
Durant founded the company in 1908 as a vehicle for the man-
agement of multiple automotive brands.94 The well-known auto-
motive brands owned by General Motors included Chevrolet, Pon-
tiac, GMC, Oldsmobile, Saab, Saturn, and Cadillac.
Over its history, General Motors produced nearly 450 million
vehicles globally.96 At the commencement of its chapter 11 pro-
ceeding, it employed approximately 235,000 employees.97 Its oper-
ations included four global segments-GM North America, GM
Europe, GM Latin America/AfricafMid-East, and GM Asia Pacif-
ic." As a result of its size, General Motors supported a vast net-
work of dealerships and suppliers.99 In the United States, for ex-
ample, there were 6,099 General Motors vehicle dealers as of
93. Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Obama Is Upbeat for G.M. Future on a Day of Pain,
N.Y. TiMES, June 2, 2009, at Al.
94. GM Disclosure Statement, supra note 92, at 8.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 475 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
98. GM Disclosure Statement, supra note 92, at 8-9.
99. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 475-76.
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April 30, 2009.100 "Substantially all of [General Motors'] world-
wide car and truck deliveries (totaling 8.4 million vehicles in
2008) [were] marketed through independent retail dealers or dis-
tributors."101 General Motors' supplier network included over
11,500 suppliers, of which over 600 relied upon General Motors
for more than 30% of their annual revenues.102
General Motors' early success was built largely upon its unique
strategy of supplying motor vehicles at a wide variety of price
points, thus diversifying sources of demand and creating a dis-
tinct competitive advantage.10 General Motors also utilized a
unique "just-in-time" inventory delivery system that allowed it to
produce its vehicles efficiently and minimize its fixed inventory
costs by sourcing 75-85% of its components from its supplier
network and assembling its cars within hours of delivery to avoid
inventory accumulation.10
2. The Causes of General Motors' Bankruptcy
After many decades of unparalleled business success in the au-
tomotive industry, General Motors began to decline in the late
twentieth century as it failed to adapt to the rapidly changing
business environment and respond to increasingly intense compe-
tition from abroad. Foreign competitors such as Toyota, Nissan,
and Honda, unburdened by the debilitating legacy costs that pla-
gued General Motors, gained ever greater market share in the
automotive industry. 0 General Motors, which spent $103 billion
100. GM Disclosure Statement, supra note 92, at 9.
101. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 475.
102. Id. at 476.
103. GM Disclosure Statement, supra note 92, at 8.
104. Id. at 9.
105. See GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, RESTRUCTURING PLAN FOR LONG-TERM
VIABILITY, Submitted to Senate Banking Comm. & House of Representatives Financial
Services Comm., 7 (Dec. 2, 2008), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/GMPlan.
pdf [hereinafter GM VIABILITY PLAN]; see also In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 476,
478.
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on funding its employee-related legacy obligations in the fifteen
years prior to 2008, could not overcome this disadvantage.10 6
Some commentators argued that General Motors' decline was
due primarily to poor business strategy, not merely burdensome
legacy costs. In an April 2, 2009 report, for example, financial
analysts at AllianceBernstein L.P. argued that General Motors
remained stuck in an outdated mode of thinking that resisted re-
ducing manufacturing capacity, product offering, and dealer den-
sity.o' As a result, General Motors relied solely upon price-cutting
to remain competitive, selling cars at "below breakeven cost" and
driving industry prices downward. 0o According to the report, this
high fixed-cost, low-price model "is why the company [was] he-
morrhaging cash and [was] head[ed] for Chapter 11."109 Addition-
ally, the White House viewed General Motors as having an out-
dated product mix focused heavily on trucks and sport utility
vehicles at a time when consumer preferences were shifting to-
ward smaller vehicles.,"
Regardless of the reason, General Motors' business suffered a
substantial decline in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. Between 1980 and 2008, General Motors' market share
fell from 45% to 22%." Its common stock declined from $93.62
per share as of April 28, 2000 to $1.09 per share as of May 15,
2009.112 Its market capitalization fell by $59.5 billion."' By the
time the financial crisis of 2008 struck, General Motors was al-
ready extremely vulnerable to any adverse market events.
Besides the deteriorating strength of the economy and loss of
consumer purchasing power, General Motors' bankruptcy was
precipitated in part by its difficulty managing increasingly esca-
lating healthcare obligations to its employees."- General Motors
106. GM VIABILITY PLAN, supra note 105, at 7.
107. Max Warburton et al., European Autos: Why a GM Bankruptcy Can Raise Euro-
pean and Japanese Auto Industry Returns, BERNSTEINRESEARCH 1-2 (Apr. 2, 2009), http://
blogs.ft.com/business blog/files2009/05fbernstein.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON AUTOS, DETERMINATION OF VIABILITY SUMMARY:
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION 1 (Mar. 30, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/assets/documents/GMviability.Assessment.pdf.
111. GM Disclosure Statement, supra note 92, at 10.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 9.
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maintained trusts to provide its employees with healthcare and
life insurance benefits upon retirement."' These trusts became
increasingly burdened over time as General Motors' legacy obliga-
tions to its retirees spiraled out of control. In February 2008,
General Motors entered into a settlement agreement with the
United Auto Workers ("UAW") that created a new retiree benefit
plan for which UAW would have exclusive responsibility and to
which General Motors would be required to make fixed and
capped contributions.16 At the time of General Motors' filing, its
obligations with regard to the plan totaled approximately $20.56
billion in principal amount."
3. The 2008 Financial Crisis Triggers General Motors'
Bankruptcy Filing
While fundamental business problems were the primary long-
term causes of General Motors' bankruptcy filing, the financial
crisis and subsequent liquidity crisis of 2008 accelerated General
Motors' decline and forced it into bankruptcy. The tightening of
credit markets that occurred after the failure of key American fi-
nancial institutions, and the general anxiety of American con-
sumers, triggered a 30% decline in U.S. auto sales over the span
of only a few months."8 At the same time, GMAC, General Mo-
tors' financing arm, was effectively cut off from secondary mar-
kets, so that the percentage of purchases for which General Mo-
tors was able to provide installment or lease financing fell from
just under 50% to only 6% within a year.'19 Already weakened by
structural and economic factors, General Motors was forced to
seek financial assistance from the U.S. Government shortly after
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. collapsed on September 15,
2008.120
On November 21, 2008, congressional leaders sent General Mo-
tors, Chrysler LLC, and Ford Motor Company a letter setting
forth a framework for them to request Government loans.121 On
115. Id.
116. Id. at 9-10
117. Id. at 10,
118. Id. at 8.
119. Id. See also GM VIABILTY PLAN, supra note 105, at 8.
120. GM Disclosure Statement, supra note 92, at 11.
121. Id.
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December 2, 2008, General Motors submitted a proposed viability
plan to the Senate Banking Committee and the House of Repre-
sentatives Financial Services Committee.122 The viability plan re-
quested a total term loan of $12 billion consisting of
an immediate loan of $4 billion to insure minimum liquidity through
the end of 2008, a second $4 billion draw in January 2009, a third
draw of $2 billion in February 2009, and a fourth draw of $2 billion,
at an unstated date in 2009 . .. [and] access to an incremental $6 bil-
lion line of credit.123
Congress failed to act on General Motors' request, prompting
General Motors to seek financial assistance from the United
States Department of the Treasury ("U.S. Treasury").124
On December 19, 2008, former President George W. Bush announced
that the outgoing administration would make short-term, emergency
funding available to [General Motors] and Chrysler under the
Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") to prevent both companies
from commencing immediate bankruptcy cases. On December 31,
2008, [General Motors] and the U.S. Treasury entered into an
agreement . . . that provided [General Motors] with emergency fi-
nancing of up to an initial $13.4 billion pursuant to a secured term
loan facility (the "U.S. Treasury Facility"). [General Motors] bor-
rowed $4.0 billion from the U.S. Treasury on December 31, 2008 and
an additional $5.4 billion on January 21, 2009. The remaining $4.0
billion was borrowed on February 17, 2009.12s
Pursuant to the U.S. Treasury Facility, General Motors was
required to "develop a proposal to transform its business and
demonstrate future viability."'26 It submitted this plan to the au-
tomobile industry task force appointed by President Obama on
February 17, 2009.127 The plan focused on "long-term viability, in-
ternational competitiveness, and energy efficiency . . . ."12 On
March 30, 2009, President Obama announced that "[the new via-
bility plan] was not satisfactory and did not justify a substantial
new investment of taxpayer dollars."129 The President agreed to
"extend adequate working capital for a period of another sixty
days . . . ," subject to General Motors' efforts to reach an agree-
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 12.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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ment with its bondholders and the UAW "regarding debt reduc-
tion, and the submission of a revised business plan . . . ."13o The
United States gave General Motors until June 1, 2009 to demon-
strate that its viability plan could successfully transform it into a
profitable company. m
Simultaneously with the negotiation of the U.S. Treasury Fa-
cility, General Motors proposed an out-of-court bond exchange of-
fer to raise additional financing to strengthen its business."' On
April 27, 2009, General Motors "launched a public exchange offer
for the approximately $27 billion of its unsecured bonds . . ..
General Motors announced that, "if it did not receive enough ten-
ders to consummate the Exchange Offer," it would be forced to file
for bankruptcy in order to restructure its business. 13 4 Complicat-
ing matters for General Motors, the exchange offer was subject to
extensive negotiations with the U.S. Treasury, which, as General
Motors' largest secured creditor, sought to protect the value of its
investment in General Motors. For example, the U.S. Treasury
required "the conversion to equity of . .. at least 50% of [General
Motors'] outstanding U.S. Treasury debt at June 1, 2009 (approx-
imately $10 billion . . )" as part of the exchange offer.' 3' "The Ex-
change Offer expired on May 26, 2009 without achieving the
threshold of required tendered acceptances."136
4. General Motors' Bankruptcy
General Motors filed for bankruptcy protection in the Southern
District of New York on June 1, 2009,137 and the case was as-
signed to Judge Robert E. Gerber. 3 At the time of filing, General
Motors' assets on a consolidated basis totaled $82.3 billion; its
liabilities totaled $172.8 billion.3 9
130. Id.
131. Id. at 13.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 14.
137. Voluntary Petition at 2, In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009) (No. 09-50026).
138. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
139. Voluntary Petition, supra note 137, Exhibit A at 1.
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Prior to filing, General Motors worked with the U.S. Treasury
to devise a "prepackaged" bankruptcy filing under which it would
sell substantially all of its assets to a newly constituted General
Motors that would be sponsored by the U.S. Treasury. 0 Under
this plan, substantially all of General Motors' assets were sold
pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 363 to Vehicle Acquisition Hold-
ings LLC, a purchaser sponsored by the U.S. Treasury ("363
Transaction").141 The proceeds of the sale, as well as General Mo-
tors' other assets, remained in a liquidation company called Mo-
tors Liquidation Company ("MLC").142 On July 10, 2009, a master
sale and purchase agreement consummated the sale of General
Motors' assets.14 3 Following the sale, the purchaser took the name
General Motors Company ("New GM") and continued as an oper-
ating company. 44
5. U.S. Government Involvement
Perhaps the most unique feature of General Motors' bankrupt-
cy proceeding, and the aspect that garnered the most commen-
tary, was the level of Government involvement. The U.S. Gov-
ernment was involved with every stage of General Motors'
bankruptcy. The U.S. Government's support of General Motors
reflected a desire to prevent the catastrophic economy-wide im-
pacts that would have resulted from General Motors' collapse, in-
cluding the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs, secondary im-
pacts on dealers and suppliers, and even the potential failure of
the entire U.S. automotive industry.145 As stated in the restruc-
turing plan that General Motors submitted to Congress on De-
cember 2, 2008, "[a] failure by [General Motors] will likely trigger
catastrophic damage to the U.S. economy, precipitating failures
among component and logistic suppliers, other domestic car man-
ufacturers, raw material suppliers, technology and service pro-
140. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 479-80; GM Disclosure Statement supra note
92, at 14.
141. See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 473.
142. GM Disclosure Statement, supra note 92, at 16-19.
143. Id. at 14, 16.
144. Id. at 16-17.
145. See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 477.
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viders, retailers and their suppliers, and [General Motors'] credi-
tors and financial institutions."146
As described in some detail above, the U.S. Government used
its leverage as General Motors' largest secured lender to demand
a complete structural overhaul of General Motors' business, in-
cluding a renegotiation of its legacy obligations with the UAW,
aggressive operational restructuring, and an increased emphasis
on developing environmentally friendly vehicles.17 The Obama
Administration, in declining to extend additional financing to
General Motors on March 30, 2009, announced the resignation of
General Motors' CEO Rick Wagoner."1*
Active Government involvement in General Motors' restructur-
ing continued after it filed for bankruptcy on June 1, 2009. The
U.S. Treasury, the Government of Canada, and the Government
of Ontario agreed to provide debtor-in-possession financing to al-
low General Motors to finance its operations during the bank-
ruptcy proceedings."' However, this funding was contingent upon
General Motors selling substantially all of its assets via the 363
Transaction to a U.S. Treasury-sponsored purchaser.15 0 The U.S.
Government sought to utilize its strong position in General Mo-
tors' capital structure to ensure that its investment would result
in a sustainable New GM and a revitalization of the U.S. automo-
tive industry.m15
6. Criticism of General Motors' Bankruptcy
The rapid speed of the bankruptcy court's approval of the § 363
Transaction, and the Government's close involvement with the
entire process, sparked intense criticism of General Motors' bank-
ruptcy reorganization. Many commentators objected to the fact
146. GM VIABILITY PLAN, supra note 105, at 8-9.
147. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 479 (discussing the U.S. Government's condi-
tion that General Motors reach an agreement with UAW); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
AUTOS, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION NEW PATH TO VIABILITY FOR GM & CHRYSLER 2-3, avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/fact sheetGMChrysler.pdf (noting
that the U.S. Government required GM to undergo "aggressive operational restructuring"
and to develop cost effective high efficiency vehicles).
148. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON AUTOS, supra note 147, at 2.
149. GM Disclosure Statement, supra note 92, at 14; In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R.
at 480.
150. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 480.
151. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON AUTOS, supra note 147, at 2-3.
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that the bankruptcy court quickly approved the 363 Transaction
over the objections of dissident unsecured bondholders.15 2 Others
argued that the sale constituted an impermissible sub rosa
plan. 153
At the core of the criticisms of the General Motors' bankruptcy
is the idea that the bankruptcy court, under pressure from the
U.S. Government to quickly approve the 363 Transaction and al-
low New GM to begin operations as an ongoing entity, trampled
upon longstanding protections provided by the bankruptcy
process.5 4 Professor Douglas Baird of the University of Chicago
Law School, in his testimony before the House Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law, argued that the bidding
procedures that the court approved essentially "locked in" the
U.S. Government-favored sale by creating disincentives to other
competing bids.' 5 Professor Barry Adler, from New York Univer-
sity School of Law, took a similar position in his written state-
ment to the Congressional Oversight Panel, arguing that the case
set a dangerous precedent for the disregard of creditor rights in
bankruptcy cases with dominant stakeholders (in this case, the
U.S. Government).,"s These two examples demonstrate the extent
of anxiety over the process by which General Motors' reorganiza-
tion was achieved. While there is no doubt-as found by the
court-that an expedited sale process was the only way for Gen-
eral Motors to restore viability,'57 this desirable outcome was
152. See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 517-18 (addressing the objections raised
by the unsecured bondholders).
153. Id. at 495; see also Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases
in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531, 539-40 (2009). As explained by Lubben in his article,
the term "sub rosa plan" refers to a tactic of effectively implementing a reorganization
plan by selling all of a debtor's assets through a § 363 sale, thus avoiding the numerous
procedural protections for creditors and claimants that the Bankruptcy Code requires dur-
ing the plan confirmation process. Id. at 533-35, 538. In other words, a sub rosa plan
seeks not only to sell the debtor's assets, but also to allocate or dictate the distribution of
sale proceeds among different classes of creditors. See id. at 538 (discussing the bankrupt-
cy court's rejection of the argument that the sale was an impermissible sub rosa plan).
154. See, e.g., AIFP Hearing, Before the Congressional Oversight Panel, 111th Cong.
(Aug. 5, 2009) (statement of Barry E. Adler, The Charles Seligson Professor, New York
University School of Law) [hereinafter Adler Statement]. Ramifications of Auto Industry
Bankruptcies, Part III: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 63-64 (July 22, 2009) (statement of Douglas
G. Baird, Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago
Law School) [hereinafter Baird Statement].
155. Baird Statement, supra note 154, at 62-63.
156. Adler Statement, supra note 154, at 2, 7.
157. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 478.
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achieved only at the considerable expense of arguably disregard-
ing established bankruptcy procedure and creating a precedent
for expansive Government control over bankruptcy cases, albeit
only in extreme circumstances.
C. Secured Credit Market
A primary theme in the collapse and bankruptcy cases of both
Lehman Brothers and General Motors was the severe impact on
both companies of the sudden lack of financing as lenders' confi-
dence waned. This theme is indicative of the new "normal" lend-
ing environment that has emerged and presents a challenging
environment for both lenders and borrowers. The Lehman Broth-
ers' and General Motors' cases show the speed with which mas-
sive corporate entities can fail in the midst of lending freezes sim-
ilar to that precipitated by the panic of 2008 and early 2009. The
lending market is essential for the efficient and dependable oper-
ation of corporate America, but its vitality can be negatively im-
pacted by macro- or micro-economic events. We have addressed
above how economic factors combined with susceptible business
models forced Lehman Brothers and General Motors to seek
bankruptcy protection. The resulting economic environment also
produced severe secondary impacts. Here, we now examine the
secondary results of the fragile economic environment that re-
sulted from the financial crisis and the bankruptcy filings of
Lehman Brothers and General Motors,' and how these economic
conditions ultimately affected the courts.
Besides the various rulings in the Lehman Brothers' and Gen-
eral Motors' bankruptcy cases, other courts have examined issues
or whole cases that bore directly on the credit crisis or issues re-
levant thereto. The subprime crisis itself spawned numerous
bankruptcy cases involving the subprime mortgage industry, in-
cluding New Century Financial Corporation,"' American Home
Mortgage Investment Corporation,1so Fremont General Corpora-
158. The economy in 2008 and 2009 was characterized by a series of interrelated im-
plosions. See Vernan Smith, There's No Easy Way Out of the Bubble, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9,
2008, at A17. The consumer real estate crash and the accompanying subprime mortgage-
related failings exemplify the complete lack of confidence and distrust that ran rampant in
the asset-based lending market at the time. Id.
159. In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 407 B.R. 558 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
160. Calyon N.Y. Branch v. Am. Home Mort. Corp., (In re Am. Home Mort. Corp.) 379
B.R. 503 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).
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tion,161 Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization LLC,16 2
and countless others. A number of rulings shocked the secured
lending markets and may have a lasting impact on secured lend-
ing jurisprudence if they are followed by other courts. Three such
cases-In re TOUSA, Inc.,'16 In re Yellowstone Mountain Club,
LLC, 64 and In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC'65-are discussed
in further detail below.
A decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Florida in In re TOUSA, Inc. to avoid nearly
$500 million in liens granted to first and second lien term lenders
and recover the proceeds from the term lenders and a loan trans-
feree proceeds sent a shockwave through the secured lending
market.16  TOUSA and its subsidiaries were engaged in the busi-
ness of designing, building, and marketing detached single-family
residences, town homes, and condominiums.'6 7 The court deter-
mined that the subsidiaries that granted the liens were insolvent
when the obligations were incurred, relying on both contempora-
neous market evidence and expert reports and testimony.6
Among the contemporaneous evidence considered by the court
were the downturn in the housing industry that began in early
2006, TOUSA's purported early recognition of the severity of the
downturn, downgrades by ratings agencies and negative reports
by industry experts, and the fact that TOUSA's stock price fell
from a high of $23 during 2006 to below $4 by April 2007.169
The court next examined whether reasonably equivalent value
was received in exchange for the obligation incurred.170 The rele-
vant inquiry was whether the subsidiaries received reasonably
equivalent value, because the subsidiaries had incurred the obli-
161. In re Fremont Gen. Corp., No. 08-bk-13421, 2010 WL 4739439 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
June 9, 2010).
162. In re Credit-Based Asset Servicing & Securitization LLC, No. 10-16040, 2010 WL
5136414 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2010).
163. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of TOUSA, Inc. v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc. (In
re TOUSA, Inc.), 422 B.R. 783 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
164. Credit Suisse v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Yellowstone Moun-
tain Club, LLC), 415 B.R. 769 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009).
165. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010).
166. In re TOUSA, Inc., 422 B.R. at 855.
167. Id. at 787.
168. Id. at 790-839.
169. Id. at 790-839, 851.
170. Id. at 843-50.
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gations by granting liens on their assets."' The court concluded
that the subsidiaries received no direct benefit because the loan
proceeds went directly to the parent company. 172 Utilizing Bank-
ruptcy Code § 550, the court ordered disgorgement of the proceeds
of the lien transfers from the recipients of the lien transfers and a
group of lenders that subsequently received the proceeds in satis-
faction of a pre-existing debt."'
Perhaps most relevant to the secured lending market, the court
determined that "savings clauses," which provided for a reduction
of the obligations incurred as well as liens granted by the subsid-
iaries to the extent necessary to prevent their insolvency, had no
impact and were irrelevant because the subsidiaries were insol-
vent even before the transaction and received no value from the
transaction.174 In what many now view as dicta, the court further
opined that the savings clauses were unenforceable.17 5 The court
reasoned that an interest of the debtor in "property becomes
property of the estate, notwithstanding any 'provision in an
agreement' that is 'conditioned on the insolvency or financial con-
dition of the debtor' that 'effects or gives an option to effect a for-
feiture, modification or termination of the debtor's interest in
property.""7 6 Secured lenders should be particularly troubled by
the nullification of a savings clause-a tool commonly utilized by
secured lenders-that was negotiated by two sophisticated par-
ties. The decision was appealed to the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida.'7 7
Upon appeal by a group of lenders referred to as the "Transeas-
tern Lenders," Judge Alan S. Gold of the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida recently quashed the bankruptcy
court's decision in In re TOUSA, Inc.17 8 In a scathing opinion,
Judge Gold determined that the bankruptcy court erroneously
171. Id. at 867.
172. Id. at 844-45.
173. Id. at 886-87 (applying 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2006)).
174. In re TOUSA, Inc., 422 B.R. at 863.
175. Id. at 863-64.
176. Id. at 863.
177. 3V Capital Master Fund Ltd. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of TOUSA,
Inc. (In re TOUSA, Inc.), Nos. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 10-61478, 10-62032, 10-62035, 10-
62037, 2011 WL 522008, at *1, *52 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011).
178. Id. The proceeds of the lien transfers made by the conveying subsidiaries were
transferred to the Transeastern Lenders in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt. Id. at *52.
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avoided the lien transfers.'" In avoiding the lien transfers, the
bankruptcy court held that the subsidiaries had a property inter-
est in the proceeds of the lien transfers, that the subsidiaries re-
ceived less than reasonably equivalent value from the transfer,
and that the subsidiaries were insolvent when the transfer was
made.80 In his decision, Judge Gold found that the subsidiaries
had no property interest in the loan proceeds because they never
had control over the use of those proceeds.18, He also determined
that the subsidiaries received reasonably equivalent value in ex-
change for the lien transfers because the transfers allowed them
to satisfy a pre-existing debt and thus stave off bankruptcy.18 2 Ac-
cordingly, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 548, the transfers
should not have been avoided.83 The court also concluded that the
proceeds of the lien transfers should not have been disgorged
from the Transeastern Lenders, because those transferees did not
qualify as entities "for whose benefit" the lien transfers were
made.184 Two other lender groups, first and second lien lenders,
also appealed the bankruptcy court's opinion.185 Those appeals are
still pending before the district court. Despite the district court's
recent decision, In re TOUSA, Inc. still serves to highlight the
risk and unpredictability that faces secured lenders in the cur-
rent political climate.
A more aggressive approach to secured lenders was taken by
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana
when it equitably subordinated the claim of the secured lender
against the debtors, Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC and its af-
filiated entities.8 66 The debtor entities in Yellowstone were created
179.Id. at *52.
180. In re TOUSA, Inc., 422 B.R. at 872-75 (finding that the subsidiaries had a "prop-
erty interest" in the loan proceeds).
181. In re TOUSA, Inc., 2011 WL 522008, at *23.
182. See id. at *39-40.
183. See id. at *26-43. Under Bankruptcy Code § 548, a transfer may be avoided where
the debtor has a property interest in the property transferred, the debtor did not receive
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer, and the debtor was insolvent at
the time of the transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2006).
184. In re TOUSA, Inc., 2011 WL 522008, at *47. Under § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code,
an avoided transfer may be recovered from a party "for whose benefit" the transfer was
made. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2006).
185. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of TOUSA, Inc.,
No. 10-60018 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2010); Citicorp North America Inc. v. Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of TOUSA, Inc., No. 10-60019 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 5,
2010).
186. See Credit Suisse v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Yellowstone
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for the purpose of developing the Yellowstone Club, a member-
ship-only, master-planned development situated on 13,500 acres
of private land near the northwest corner of Yellowstone National
Park.8 On September 30, 2005, the debtors entered into a syndi-
cated loan agreement for $375 million.' 8 The debtors filed for
bankruptcy on November 10, 2008,89 and the Creditors' Commit-
tee filed a complaint against the secured lender seeking to subor-
dinate its claim190
In harsh language, the court noted "[t]he naked greed in this
case combined with [the lender's] complete disregard for the Deb-
tors or any other person or entity . . . , shocks the conscience of
[the] Court."1'9 The court's ruling was based upon its determina-
tion that the loan at issue was unrelated to the debtors' business,
was based upon questionable appraisals, and seemed to only ben-
efit the bank and one individual member of the borrower-all at
the expense of unsecured creditors.192
While the case was eventually settled before the appellate
process could proceed, and was certainly a product of the specific
facts before the court, the Yellowstone decision is perhaps illustr-
ative of a national climate in which adverse presumptions are
drawn against secured lenders. Likewise, in Philadelphia News-
papers, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed what has
been viewed as a bedrock right of secured lenders-the right to
credit bid a secured claim. 9 3 The court held that secured creditors
did not have such a right when sought to be exercised in a sale
process proceeding within a plan of reorganization.194
The debtors proposed a plan of reorganization that included a
sale at public auction of substantially all of their assets free and
clear of all liens. '6 The proposed plan would transfer the proceeds
Mountain Club, LLC), No. 08-61570-11, 2009 WL 3094930, at *7 (Bankr. D. Mont. May 12,
2009) (partial and interim order).
187. Id. at *2.
188. Id. at *3.
189. Voluntary Petition, In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, No. 08-61570 (D.
Mont. Nov. 10, 2008).
190. In re Yellowstone, 2009 WL 3094930, at *7.
191. Id. at *9.
192. Id. at *7-10.
193. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
194. Id. at 317.
195. Id. at 301.
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of the sale and the headquarters to the secured lenders in full sa-
tisfaction of their claims.196 The secured lenders objected to the
plan because it required all bids on the sale to be in cash.' Sec-
tion 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee
to sell, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of
the estate. 9 When a sale is made pursuant to § 363(b) upon mo-
tion by a trustee, § 363(k) allows secured lenders to "credit-bid"-
to bid up to the full amount of their secured debt claim to acquire
the assets to which their lien is attached in exchange for cancella-
tion of indebtedness in the amount of the bid.'99 This makes it eas-
ier for secured lenders to recover the value of their collateral. The
Philadelphia Newspapers court addressed whether secured lend-
ers have a statutory right to credit bid when assets are sold as
part of a plan of reorganization, rather than in a § 363(b) sale.2 00
A plan of reorganization may be approved despite the objec-
tions of a secured creditor 201 if the plan does not discriminate un-
fairly and is "fair and equitable" with respect to each class of
claims that is impaired under the plan.20 2 Under § 1129(b)(2)(A) of
the Bankruptcy Code, a plan of reorganization that contemplates
an asset sale is "fair and equitable" from the perspective of a se-
cured lender if the collateral is sold free and clear of liens, pay-
ment is made from the sale proceeds, and in most instances, the
secured creditor is allowed to credit bid its claim. 203 A plan may
also be "fair and equitable" if the secured creditor receives the
"indubitable equivalent" of its claim under the plan. 04 The Phila-
delphia Newspapers court considered whether, under the terms of
§ 1129(b)(2)(A), a plan must allow a secured creditor to credit bid
on an asset sale in order to meet the "fair and equitable" stan-
dard.20 5
The Third Circuit upheld the plan of reorganization over the
objections of the secured lenders despite the fact that it did not
196. Id. at 302.
197. Id. at 302, 309.
198. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006).
199. Id. § 363(k); In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 305 n.6.
200. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301, 302.
201. Such a procedure is referred to as a "cramdown." Id. at 304.
202. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006).
203. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A); In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 305.
204. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 305 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)).
205. Id. at 303-04.
1140 [Vol. 45:1111
2008 ECONOMIC COLLAPSE
include the right to credit bid.20 6 Relying on what it characterized
as the "plain meaning" of § 1129(b)(2)(A), the court held that the
plan of reorganization could be confirmed as it met the "fair and
equitable" standard.2 07 The court determined that the dissident
secured creditors realized the "indubitable equivalent" of their
claims under the plan, and therefore the plan was confirmable
even though it did not allow credit bidding.208
While an efficient solution to this ruling will be for secured
lenders to insist on the right to credit bid both in plans of reor-
ganization and in lending agreements, the fact that a bankruptcy
court limited the secured lender's rights-affirmed by a United
States circuit court-is controversial and concerning to the se-
cured lending market.209
In general, these cases show that courts may be inclined in the
current environment to make adverse presumptions against se-
cured lenders, assuming the right facts are presented to them.
Many of the cases and disputes borne out of the credit crisis in
2008 and thereafter are still being processed in the courts. We are
likely to see additional decisions that reflect the economic cli-
mate, concerns, and distrust that were rampant at that time.
III. CONCLUSION
The "new" economic and lending environment, as reflected in
the foregoing cases, as well as in the high-profile bankruptcies of
Lehman Brothers and General Motors, is a direct consequence of
the unprecedented financial crisis of 2008 and early 2009. As the
U.S. economy and financial markets continue their recovery, the
memory of these experiences will not lose their forcefulness.
Whether lessons have been learned by key market participants
that will prevent future economic catastrophes remains to be
seen. What is certain, however, is that the judicial reaction
sparked by the severe consequences of the financial crisis will
206. Id. at 318.
207. Id. at 304-10.
208. Id. at 310-14, 318.
209. See, Jonathan N. Helfat, Richard M. Kohn, & Jill A.G. Zellmer, Ten Assumptions
that Secured Lenders Should Not Make in 2010, THE SECURED LENDER, Mar. 2010, at 32-
35; Bobby Guy & Jennifer O'Guinn, Attacks Continue on Lenders' Right to Credit Bid in
363 Sales, THE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE RENEWAL, May 13, 2010, http://www.turnaround.
orgfPublications/Articles.aspx?objectID=12844.
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have long-term ramifications for American jurisprudence. The
precedent set by courts during this unique time in American his-
tory will remain in effect long after market conditions have
shifted. Further, government policy and legal precedent are likely
to continue to demonstrate a conservative tendency in an attempt
to avoid the massive consequences of the economic strategies that
led to the recent financial crisis.
